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## Viewing cable 04ANKARA2360, TURKISH MFA REQUESTS U.S. ACTION AT UN, U.S. HELP

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags `#cablegate` and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. `#04ANKARA2360`.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">04ANKARA2360</a>	2004-04-28 05:34	2011-08-30 01:44	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	Embassy Ankara

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.tanea.gr>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002360

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2014  
TAGS: [CY](#) [GR](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#)  
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA REQUESTS U.S. ACTION AT UN, U.S. HELP  
FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS

(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4  
(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 27 meeting with DCM, Turkish MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin requested that the U.S. push the UNSC for a Presidential Statement placing blame on the Greek Cypriots for failure to reach a Cyprus settlement. He also asked that the U.S. make concrete gestures toward Turkish Cypriots. End Summary.

April 28 UN SYG Briefing

¶2. (C) Ilkin noted that the SYG will brief the UNSC April 28, although it is not clear whether there will be a UNSC debate. Ilkin pointed out that after Cyprus negotiations in Copenhagen and the Hague, the UNSC issued Presidential Statements blaming the Turkish Cypriot side. This time, Turkey wants the UNSC to show "evenhandedness" and issue the same type of statement directed at the Greek Cypriots. The Turks want the U.S. to work in the UNSC to get a statement including the "realities" of what happened and the same kind of assessment of blame as previous statements. Turkey also hoped there might be an informal UNSC discussion which would provide an opportunity for the GOT to express its view.

¶3. (C) Ilkin, stressed that the Turks want to get something tangible on the record blaming the Greek Cypriots or their leadership while the memories of the referendum and events leading up to it are still fresh. Ilkin worries that memories will be short and the window for getting this on the record will close.

14. (C) In a follow-up conversation, Cyprus Department Head Bilman hoped a statement would include the fact that Turkish Cypriots said yes to the UN plan, while the Greek Cypriots said no; and a declaration that there is now a new situation on the island and the Turkish Cypriots' isolation should end.

15. (C) Ilkin said the Turks hope to use the statement to garner EU support for lifting the embargo on the "TRNC" and taking other measures to support Turkish Cypriots.

U.S. Gesture to Turkish Cypriots

16. (C) Ilkin requested that the U.S. make "even a small gesture" toward Turkish Cypriots. The Turks think this will encourage other countries to follow. Ilkin said that this would also "influence our modalities" of dealing with the Greek Cypriots. (Bilman later explained this means improvements in the lot of Turkish Cypriots might enable the Turks to reach out to Greek Cypriots.) Ilkin added that he is not seeking recognition for the "TRNC", but rather a symbolic but concrete gesture toward Turkish Cypriots, e.g., in the area of transportation. Ilkin said that the EU's new regulation on the Green Line would be the first indication of the EU attitude toward Turkish Cypriots after the referendum.

17. (C) DCM responded that the U.S. is actively considering and discussing ways to ameliorate the Turkish Cypriots' situation. However, many of the issues involved are technical and require careful consideration. The U.S. is also engaged with the EU in this effort, including a just-concluded visit by PDAS Ries to Brussels. At the UN, the U.S. is already working to have the SYG's report reflect settlement efforts by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. DCM told Ilkin that the real prize for Turkey is getting a date to begin accession negotiations in December, and it needs to keep its strategy focused on that objective.

EDELMAN